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RISK AND RESILIENCE IN HEALTH DATA 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
W. NICHOLSON PRICE II, PHD * 
Today’s health system runs on data. However, for a system that 
generates and requires so much data, the health care system is surprisingly 
bad at maintaining, connecting, and using those data. In the easy cases of 
coordinated care and stationary patients, the system works—sometimes. But 
when care is fragmented, fragmented data often result. 
Fragmented data create risks both to individual patients and to the 
system. For patients, fragmentation creates risks in care based on incomplete 
or incorrect information, and may also lead to privacy risks from a patched-
together system. For the system, data fragmentation hinders efforts to 
improve efficiency and quality, and to drive health innovation based on 
collected data. 
Efforts to combat data fragmentation would benefit by considering the 
idea of health data infrastructure. Most obviously, that would be 
infrastructure for health data—that is, infrastructure on which health data 
can be stored and transmitted. But it should also be an infrastructure of 
health data—that is, a platform of shared data on which to base further 
efforts to increase the efficiency or quality of care. 
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Today’s health system runs on data. Patients and doctors 
complain about the proportion of time during a patient appointment 
that is spent entering data into the doctor’s computer, but this has 
become the new normal. Data have the potential to help improve care 
for individual patients, to increase the efficiency of the system as a 
whole, and to provide the basis for future innovation in care.1 
However, for a system that generates and requires so much data, 
the health care system is surprisingly bad at maintaining, connecting, 
and using those data. In the easy cases, it works. If a patient stays 
with the same primary care physician, coordinates all care through 
that physician, goes to the same pharmacy, the same hospital, and the 
same labs, and uses the same insurer, that patient’s records may—
may—be integrated into a single comprehensive medical record that 
tracks the patient’s health over time.2 But patients don’t behave like 
this most of the time. Patients move between providers, pick up 
drugs while traveling, switch insurers as they change jobs (or lose 
them), see different specialists, and generally vary the parameters of 
their care. And the health data system does a poor job accounting for 
this fragmentation of care, resulting in fragmented data.3 
Fragmented data create risks to patients and to the system as a 
whole. At the patient level, fragmentation creates risks in care, where 
information necessary for effective care is either not available or 
incorrect. Fragmentation also creates risks for patient privacy, as a 
result of the needs to haphazardly share data across different health 
actors.4 At the systemic level, data fragmentation hinders efforts to 
make the system more efficient as a whole, because putative 
optimizers only see a fragment of the picture. It also slows innovation 
in health, especially big-data driven modern initiatives that rely on 
large, high-quality datasets for their power and accuracy.5 
 
 1. See infra Section I.A. 
 2. Integrated records also exist when the provision of care is itself integrated rather 
than fragmented; an integrated care provider of care such as Kaiser Permanente can 
maintain integrated health records because that one entity provides all aspects of patient 
care and payment. See infra Section I.B.1. Even for integrated providers, however, patient 
records may be fragmented when patients shift between providers over time. 
 3. See infra Section I.A. 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. See id. 
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Efforts to combat data fragmentation would benefit from 
looking at health data through an infrastructure lens. I draw on Brett 
Frischmann’s extensive analysis of infrastructure, which he 
characterizes as largely nonrivalrous resources that derive value 
principally from their many downstream uses.6 Most obviously, 
health data infrastructure would be infrastructure for health data—
that is, infrastructure on which health data can be stored and 
transmitted (such as computer systems, shared data standards, and 
the like). But it should also be infrastructure of health data—that is, a 
platform of shared data on which to base further efforts to increase 
the efficiency or quality of care. In an infrastructure of data, the data 
themselves are a resource to enable productive downstream activity 
that can improve the health care system. 
This essay proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the landscape 
of health data today, including potential benefits of the collection and 
analysis of health data and the reasons for fragmentation that limits 
those benefits. Part II describes the risks that arise from a fragmented 
health data system. To be clear: this brief essay does not attempt to 
completely catalog all risks that arise from the use of data in health 
care; it focuses instead on a subset of particularly salient risks that 
arise specifically from the problem of fragmentation.7 Part III 
sketches the basics of an infrastructure vision for and of health data. 
I. HEALTH DATA TODAY 
The health system generates a blizzard of data at an increasing 
rate. From the paper records of prior practice, providers have largely 
moved to use electronic health records (also called electronic medical 
records).8 New forms of data are proliferating to fill those records, 
including the reports of traditional medical encounters, high-volume 
 
 6. BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED 
RESOURCES 61 (2012) (describing the three key characteristics of infrastructural resources as 
nonrivalrous consumption, value derived from input into downstream uses, and the ability 
to be an input for a wide range of such downstream uses). 
 7. To take the easiest example, the underlying data may be inaccurate, whether due 
to errors collecting or entering the data, or may be systematically biased. See, e.g., Sharona 
Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Big Bad Data: Law, Public Health, and Biomedical Databases, 41 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 56 (2013). If underlying data are inaccurate, joining them into easy-to-
use centralized databases will not solve that inaccuracy (though the possibility of cross-
checking might ameliorate the problem). 
 8. The move to electronic health records was not accidental. A substantial sum was 
made available for providers to shift to electronic records. HITECH Act, passed as part of 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, div. A, tit. XIII, div. b, tit. 
IV, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). See SHARONA HOFFMAN, ELECTRONIC HEALTH 
RECORDS & MEDICAL BIG DATA: LAW AND POLICY 38–40 (2016). As a powerful counterpart, 
penalties are imposed on entities failing to shift to and meaningfully use electronic records 
by established deadlines. See id. at 41–42; Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Program 
Basics, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/regulations-and-
guidance/legislation/ehrincentiveprograms/basics.html [https://perma.cc/7DFK-AHW7] 
(last visited Jan. 12, 2016). 
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diagnostic tests, such as genetic sequencing and analysis, prescription 
records, and others.9 
A. Potential Benefits 
These data can create substantial benefits for patients, providers, 
and for the health system as a whole.10 Ideally, they should lead to 
improved care for individual patients as integrated medical records 
prevent easily avoidable medical errors and allow a broader picture 
of the patient’s overall health.11 They should enable more efficient 
care by reducing the costs of coordination, should decrease costs, and 
should even enable more effective and efficient billing for health 
treatments. On a slightly more systemic level, many health care 
reforms rely on the ability to measure care precisely—for instance, to 
observe whether patients are treated according to approved 
procedures or are readmitted to hospitals too frequently.12 Health 
data enable the imposition of sanctions or the provision of incentives 
to try to shape health care in productive ways.13 
Data can also enable us to draw more nuanced and useful 
information from the health system. Insurers and others have used 
information about actual patient experience in the health system to 
demonstrate that certain drugs are less safe than expected,14 that 
some treatments may be more cost-effective at providing the same 
benefit,15 that some patients gain more benefit from a particular 
treatment than others,16 or that a drug should be moved from 
prescription-only to over-the-counter status.17 Recently, the FDA has 
even gained the statutory authority to use this type of real-world 
evidence to approve new indications for drugs.18 More broadly, 
 
 9. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price II, Promoting Health Innovation on 
the Demand Side, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 3 (2017). 
 10. These multiple uses do not mean that doctors or others collect the data with those 
purposes in mind; data may be collected just to monitor care, or for the purposes of billing, 
or for many potential reasons. But once data are collected, they can be used in many 
different ways. 
 11. See, e.g., James R. Broughman & Ronald C. Chen, Using Big Data for Quality 
Assessment in Oncology, 5 J. COMP. EFF. RES. 309 (2016). 
 12. See id. 
 13. See Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) of 2015, Pub. L. No. 
114-10, 129 Stat. 87, § 102 (requiring a plan to develop data-based measures for physician 
and hospital performance), § 101 (creating payment incentive structures using those 
measures). 
 14. See Eisenberg & Price, supra note 9, at 7 (discussing the identification of toxic side 
effects of the painkiller Vioxx by Kaiser Permanente, which analyzed patient records in its 
integrated health system and found higher rates of heart attacks among patients taking 
Vioxx than among patients taking other similar drugs). 
 15. See id. at 16–18 (describing cost-effectiveness research and the use of observational 
studies of patient data to perform such research). 
 16. See id. (describing comparative-effectiveness research). 
 17. Id. at 7–10 (describing a petition filed by Blue Cross of California (later Wellpoint) 
to take certain antihistamines, including Claritin, over-the-counter). 
 18. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3022 (2016) (requiring FDA to 
“establish a program to evaluate the potential use of real world evidence” for the approval 
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health data can potentially lead to advances in precision medicine. 
Precision medicine, the scientific tailoring of medical treatment to 
reflect individual patient variation, requires knowing how different 
patients respond to different forms of treatment.19 Some of this 
knowledge can be generated by classical hypothesis-driven scientific 
and clinical studies, but other advances, including those relying on 
machine-learning and other forms of data mining, rely on large sets 
of existing health data.20 
Overall, health data offer substantial promise for improving 
health care, in terms of both near-term, patient-specific benefits, and 
later innovations to improve the health system. Unfortunately, these 
benefits have been slow to materialize. One cause of this slowness is 
the fragmentation of health data.21 
B. Fragmentation 
Why are health data today so fragmented? There are at least 
three linked reasons. First, and most obviously, care itself is 
fragmented. Second, and related, competition between entities in the 
health system reduces incentives to connect and link data. Third, and 
finally, legal barriers to information sharing, especially the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA), make it hard 
to link data. 
1. Fragmented Care 
The key underlying cause of health data fragmentation is that 
health care is itself frequently fragmented.22 Patients see different 
 
of new indications for an already-approved drug or to fulfill post-approval study or 
surveillance requirements). This provision has been the subject of considerable criticism. 
See, e.g., Jerry Avorn & Aaron S. Kesselheim, The 21st Century Cures Act — Will It Take Us 
Back in Time?, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2473 (2015). 
 19. Laura K. Wiley et al., Harnessing Next-Generation Informatics for Personalizing 
Medicine: A Report from AMIA’s 2014 Health Policy Invitational Meeting, 23 J. AM. MED. 
INFORMATICS ASS’N 413 (2016); Marc L Berger et al., Opportunities and Challenges in 
Leveraging Electronic Health Record Data in Oncology, 12 FUTURE ONCOL. 1261 (2016). 
 20. See W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 429–34, 
437–39 (2015) (describing the big data potential and requirements of next-generation black-
box medicine). 
 21. The fragmentation of health data is certainly not the only cause for the delay in 
realizing benefits of health data innovation. Some actors lack the right incentives to actively 
move toward the highest-quality, most efficient care. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Price, supra note 
9, at 9–10, 27–28 (discussing the problematic incentives for drug manufacturers and health 
insurers, respectively); David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less: Financial 
Incentives to Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155 (1996) (discussing the incentives of doctors 
to provide more care than necessary). Technological hurdles also play a role. See Eisenberg 
& Price, supra note 9, at 23–26. And even once innovative information is generated, getting 
health care providers to implement the new knowledge can be challenging. Id. at 28–32. 
 22. See, e.g., Alan M. Garber & Jonathan Skinner, Is American Health Care Uniquely 
Inefficient?, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 27 (2008) (noting popular wisdom that the American health 
care system is exceptionally fragmented). There are exceptions, including integrated health 
systems such as Kaiser Permanente, Geisinger, or the federally-run Indian Health Service 
and Veterans Administration. 
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doctors at different times, visit different drugstores, change insurers, 
and in other ways participate in an inherently fragmented health 
system.23 Hospitals, doctors, insurers, and pharmacies all keep their 
own records. These records are generated for different purposes and 
may use different terms or code different information.24 For instance, 
insurance claims records are principally generated for the purpose of 
payment; accordingly, they lack some forms of care data and may 
potentially be skewed.25 The relevant information about patient care 
is thus spread among different actors in the health care system, in 
different forms. 
Health data are not only generated in the course of health care. 
Research companies like 23andMe collect substantial health 
information,26 but are not involved in care and keep their data 
separate—potentially to be used for later commercial research. Non-
care entities, like Fitbit (whose activity trackers monitor physical 
activity),27 Apple (which aims to create a personal digital hub of 
health information),28 or others, also generate health data—but they 
are, of course, largely separate from the system of health and hold 
different data in different places as well. Overall, different entities 
both within and outside the health care system generate data 
separately, which are then held in different siloes. This might not be 
so problematic if communication and data-sharing between the siloes 
were easy and seamless. Unfortunately, it isn’t. 
2. Data Competition 
Even for parallel entities, like multiple doctors that a patient 
may see, competition also keeps data fragmented. Theoretically, 
among care providers, competition should be irrelevant; the duty of 
care to patients should preclude competitive hoarding of data or 
refusal to share data. But no such pressure exists for the providers of 
 
 23. See Eisenberg & Price, supra note 9, at 28–32. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at Section I.D. 
 26. Antonio Regalado, 23andMe Sells Data for Drug Search, MIT TECH. REV. (June 21, 
2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601506/23andme-sells-data-for-drug-search/ 
[https://perma.cc/F892-3PRU] (describing 23andMe’s collection of data and its sales of data 
subsets to over a dozen drug companies, including to Genentech for $10 million to search 
for Parkinson’s drugs). 
 27. Other sports companies are getting into the health data game. For instance, Nike 
recently signed a multimillion-dollar deal to collect and analyze performance data collected 
from athletes at the University of Michigan. Marc Tracy, With Wearable Tech Deals, New 
Player Data Is Up for Grabs, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/09/11/sports/ncaafootball/wearable-technology-nike-privacy-college-football.html 
[https://perma.cc/5XEW-7273]. 
 28. See A Bold New Way to Look at Your Health, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/ 
ios/health/ [https://perma.cc/QV4M-KVEW] (last visited Oct. 11, 2017) (describing the iOS 
Health App, which collects phone data and can serve as a repository for personal medical 
records). 
2017] RISK AND RESILIENCE 71 
diagnostic tests, for instance, or among others that collect health or 
health-related data.29 
In addition to competition among those who generate data, 
there is competition among the vendors who provide ways of 
generating and managing data. The electronic health record market is 
itself fragmented, with hundreds of vendors.30 This itself could 
organically lead to fragmentation through lack of interoperability, as 
different vendors develop and sell different systems that might 
happen not to work with each other. However, there is evidence that 
electronic health record vendors do more, deliberately designing 
systems that are mutually incompatible to lock customers in and 
prevent easy migration between systems.31 This lack of 
interoperability obviously hinders consolidation of data, transfers 
between providers as patients move, and the integration of care. 
3. Legal Barriers 
A third barrier to integrating health data comes from legal 
barriers to data-sharing, especially the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act, commonly known as HIPAA.32 The HIPAA 
Privacy Rule places limits on how personally identifiable health data 
may be used and disclosed.33 In general, all uses and disclosures of 
such information by covered entities—providers, insurers, and health 
 
 29. Perhaps the most well-documented such proprietary data silo is that held by 
Myriad Genetics, which amassed a dataset of information about women tested for 
mutations in the breast-cancer-related BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes while it held patents on 
those genes. See, e.g., Misha Angrist & Robert Cook-Deegan, Distributing the Future: The 
Weak Justifications for Keeping Human Genomic Databases Secret and the Challenges and 
Opportunities in Reverse Engineering Them, 3 APPL. TRANSL. GENOMICS 124 (2014) (describing 
Myriad’s dataset and others like it); Dan L. Burk, Patents as Data Aggregators in Personalized 
Medicine, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 233 (2015) (describing how patents led to Myriad’s 
competitive advantage). 
 30. See OFF. NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., Hospital Health IT 
Developers (July 2017), https://dashboard.healthit.gov/quickstats/pages/FIG-Vendors-of-
EHRs-to-Participating-Hospitals.php [https://perma.cc/P2YC-T9J9]. The top six vendors 
provide services for 92% of all nonfederal acute-care hospitals. Id. 
 31. See OFF. NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., REPORT TO CONGRESS: 
REPORT ON HEALTH INFORMATION BLOCKING 11–19 (Apr. 2015), available at 
www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/reports/info_blocking_040915.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8K8M-6E3X] (defining “information blocking” as “when persons or entities 
knowingly and unreasonably interfere with the exchange or use of electronic health information” 
and providing evidence of such practices). 
 32. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 100 Stat. 
2548 (1996). 
 33. HIPAA’s principal data restrictions come from the Privacy Rule, codified at 45 
C.F.R. § 160 (2016). HIPAA’s regulatory structure is complex and need not be discussed in 
full here; for additional information, see, e.g., U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule (May 2003), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/ 
default/files/privacysummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SBU-JX9R] (providing HIPAA 
overview); Eisenberg & Price, supra note 9, at 32–35 (discussing the Privacy Rule in the 
context of research using existing health data). 
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data clearinghouses34—are prohibited unless specifically permitted. 
To be sure, some permissions are quite broad, such as the use or 
disclosure of information for the purpose of “health care operations.” 
Theoretically, this should make it easy to share information related to 
patient care. But HIPAA still creates substantial informal barriers; 
providers and insurers are notorious for invoking HIPAA as a 
blanket excuse for refusing to share information, including for uses 
that are expressly permitted.35 As Arti Rai describes it, “compliance 
with the Common Rule [governing research on human subjects] and 
the HIPAA Privacy Rule imposes a tax on sharing data.”36 
HIPAA creates more substantial and formal barriers to sharing 
information for secondary research purposes. Research is expressly 
not a permitted purpose for use or disclosure of protected health 
information.37 As a result, secondary research often involves health 
information that has been de-identified, which takes it out of 
HIPAA’s ambit.38 However, as I have discussed elsewhere, de-
identification can increase the fragmentation of health data, because 
reassembling data about a patient from different sources becomes 
substantially more difficult—deliberately so—without identifying 
information.39 Finally, HIPAA creates barriers between different 
types of entities that assemble or create health data. HIPAA governs 
only “covered entities” that are directly involved in the health 
system.40 But increasingly, relevant health information is held by 
entities outside that system, such as 23andMe, Fitbit, Apple, or 
 
 34. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. Uses or disclosures by the business associates of covered 
entities are governed, though by contract rather than directly under HIPAA’s Privacy Rule. 
45 C.F.R. § 152(a)(3). 
 35. For examples of refusals to share information, see, e.g., Paula Span, Hipaa’s Use as 
Code of Silence Often Misinterprets the Law, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/health/hipaas-use-as-code-of-silence-often-
misinterprets-the-law.html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/L8UG-TRTF]. 
 36. Arti K. Rai, Risk Regulation and Innovation: The Case of Rights-Encumbered Biomedical 
Data Silos, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1641, 1652 (2017) (noting in addition, “At least for some 
kinds of data, this tax can be relatively modest.”). 
 37. 21 C.F.R. § 164.501. Notably, an initial version of the 21st Century CURES Act 
included a provision adding research as a permissible purpose for use or, directing the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services to “revise or clarify” the Privacy Rule so that 
research “including studies whose purpose is to obtain generalizable knowledge” is 
included as part of the exception for health care operations. See 21st Century Cures Act, 
H.R. 6, 114th Cong. § 1124 (2015), available at https://www.congress.gov/114/ 
bills/hr6/BILLS-114hr6ih.xml [https://perma.cc/V92W-WGDY]. As passed, the legislation 
calls instead for the study of such an amendment to the Privacy Rule. 21st Century Cures 
Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 2063 (2016). 
 38. HIPAA governs only personally identifiable health information; a safe harbor 
exempts any information from which 17 pieces of identifying information have been 
removed. 
 39. See W. Nicholson Price II, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1401, 1413 (2016); see also Ryan Abbott, Big Data and Pharmacovigilance: Using Health 
Information Exchanges to Revolutionize Drug Safety, 99 IOWA L. REV. 225, 252–53 (2013) (noting 
the problem of interoperability for health records). 
 40. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
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others.41 None of these entities, or the data they hold, are directly 
governed by HIPAA.42 On the one hand, this might seem to improve 
the problem of data fragmentation; these entities can gather data 
unhindered by HIPAA’s strictures. On the other hand, fragmentation 
may increase because different entities, with different forms of health 
data, are governed by different legal regimes.43 
Notably, there have also been governmental efforts to encourage 
interoperability between different health data systems. The Office of 
the National Coordinator has set out a goal of electronic health record 
interoperability by 2021 to 2024.44 And, of course, the push toward 
electronic health records was itself a federal initiative.45 Other private 
systems have been created with the goal of collecting data across 
providers in order to ensure continuous care and ease the processing 
of claims; however, these efforts have met with real challenges.46 
Overall, health data in the U.S. health care system remain highly 
fragmented among different entities, working with different and 
often mutually incompatible health records systems. 
 
 41. “Covered entities” governed by HIPAA include health plans, health information 
clearinghouses, and health-care providers who transmit certain information electronically. 
Id. Entities like 23andMe, Fitbit, and Apple fit into none of these categories. 
 42. If these entities are business associates of covered entities, they may be regulated 
by HIPAA as described in note 34, supra. 
 43. This disparity also raises separate concerns about the fragmentation of governance 
of different health data sources and types. See Nicolas Terry, Regulatory Disruption and 
Arbitrage in Healthcare Data Protection, 17 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS (forthcoming 
2017). 
 44. OFF. NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., CONNECTING HEALTH AND 
CARE FOR THE NATION: A 10-YEAR VISION TO ACHIEVE AN INTEROPERABLE HEALTH IT 
INFRASTRUCTURE (2014), available at http://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/ONC10year
InteroperabilityConceptPaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FEF-KDXH] [hereinafter ONC, 
INTEROPERABILITY 10-YEAR VISION]; OFF. NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., 
CONNECTING HEALTH AND CARE FOR THE NATION: A SHARED NATIONWIDE 
INTEROPERABILITY ROADMAP (Draft Version 1.0 April 2015), available at http://
www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/nationwide-interoperability-roadmap-draft-version-
1.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9J8-KEAX] [hereinafter ONC, INTEROPERABILITY ROADMAP]; see 
also Abbott, supra note 39, at 252–53 (noting the efforts of the Office of the National 
Coordinator in attempting to combat interoperability and fragmentation challenges). 
 45. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 
186, 231 (2009). 
 46. For instance, a group of large insurers in California created Cal INDEX, a health 
information exchange with the goal of automatically collecting and linking patient data 
from many providers. See CAL INDEX, New California Not-for-Profit to Operate Statewide, 
Next-Generation Health Information Exchange (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.stjhs.org/ 
documents/HIE/CalINDEX_news-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QG9-NV3L] (“Cal INDEX 
will securely collect and integrate clinical data from providers and claims data from payers 
to create comprehensive, retrievable patient-centered records known as longitudinal 
patient records (LPRs)”). The effort has met with limited success thus far. See Beth Kutcher, 
Insurers build broad data exchange in California, but providers are slow to join, MOD. 
HEALTHCARE (Mar. 5, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160305/ 
MAGAZINE/303059948 [https://perma.cc/KAZ4-VV9R]. 
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II. RISKS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
The risks from fragmentation in the health data system are 
substantial.47 These risks come in two main buckets: primary risks, 
which is to say risks to patients seeking care in the health system, 
including problems in the quality of patient care and problems for 
patient privacy; and secondary risks, which is to say risks that arise 
when health data are repurposed and used to innovate or improve 
the system. These categories mirror the concept of primary use of 
data for patient care and secondary use of data for other purposes.48 
A. Primary Risks 
Primary risks from health data fragmentation include both risks 
to patient health and risks to patient privacy. The risks that arise in 
patient care mirror the potential benefits of electronic health records 
(EHRs). If doctors expect patient information to be present in a 
patient’s files—to indicate, for example, the presence of an allergy or 
a drug with potential negative interactions—doctors may be less 
likely to seek out or independently confirm that information. This 
works fine if the information is actually present, but decreases the 
likelihood of catching an error when the information is missing due 
to fragmentation or otherwise. Such errors can arise from the 
transitional and fragmented status of such records, where the 
promise of comprehensive information is provided by EHRs but that 
promise is not yet realized. This is not to suggest that the previous, 
paper-based system was impervious to error—far from it—but rather 
to identify a potential source of error in the current fragmented 
system.49 
Similarly, to the extent that failures of interoperability and 
mistakes from assembling fragmented data introduce active errors in 
the system, this creates the chance for medical errors which can result 
in real harm to the patient. If, for instance, a medical administrator 
receives the records from a previous physician by fax and then adds 
them by hand to a patient’s current record, he might accidentally 
introduce errors that can compromise future care.50 This risk is quite 
familiar, as it arises from fragmented data whether paper-based or 
electronic. 
 
 47. As noted above, other risks exist in the health data system, but are not the focus of 
this brief essay. See supra note 7. 
 48. See OECD, STRENGTHENING HEALTH INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE FOR HEALTH 
CARE QUALITY GOVERNANCE: GOOD PRACTICES, NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND DATA PRIVACY 
PROTECTION CHALLENGES 22 (2013) [hereinafter OECD, HEALTH INFORMATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE]. 
 49. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 
(Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) (noting the problems of medical error in the health system). 
 50. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, The Use and Misuse of Biomedical Data: Is 
Bigger Really Better?, 39 AM. J. L. & MED. 497 (2013). 
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Lastly, when health data aren’t meaningfully collected or linked 
together, we lose the opportunity to experience better, data-driven 
care than what we now receive. This isn’t a classic “risk,” but it does 
result in costs to patients measured in foregone benefits. To take a 
simple example, suppose that, as part of a research study, a young 
woman has her genome sequenced;51 further, suppose that, although 
this woman not in a high-risk demographic group, she is in fact 
positive for an allele of the BRCA1 gene that substantially increases 
her risk of breast cancer. The researcher may not provide her with 
this information,52 and there is a substantial likelihood that her 
genome sequence may be totally separate from her medical records 
used for primary care. Thus, the patient may not be more rigorously 
screened for breast cancer, as she would be if had been identified (by 
that doctor or another involved in her direct care) as a woman with a 
deleterious BRCA1 allele. In one sense, no new risk has been 
introduced—but in another, an opportunity for improved care has 
been missed. 
The currently fragmented health data system also creates risks to 
patient privacy. Patient health data are considered by many to be 
especially sensitive, meaning that disclosure of such information is an 
especially substantial privacy concern.53 Different actors in the system 
store information in different ways, leading both to less-secure 
implementations (in, for instance, the office of the solo practitioner 
that needs to duplicate and keep unnecessary information because it 
is not available from labs, insurers, or specialists directly), and to 
potential vulnerabilities during information-sharing, when that 
occurs. Perhaps more importantly, the clunkiness of the system leads 
to workarounds and kludges that pose inherent security risks. For 
 
 51. For the sake of the example, let us assume the lab is certified under the 1967 
Clinical Laboratory Improvements Amendments (CLIA), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 263(a), and that the genetic sequencing is thus of high-enough quality to guide clinical 
care. 
 52. A substantial literature considers the question of returning results from genetic 
research, which involves questions of patient preference, the clinical validity and utility of 
research findings, the nature of the researcher-patient relationship, the question of 
informed consent, privacy concerns for patients and family about testing for inheritable 
disease susceptibility, and other challenges. This essay does not address these many issues, 
instead using the case of genetic testing as an example of a benefit foregone because of data 
fragmentation. For an introduction to issues in returning results from genetic testing, see 
Susan M. Wolf et al., The Law of Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research: Establishing 
Researchers’ Duties, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 361 (2008) (surveying the field); see also Ellen 
Wright Clayton & Amy L. McGuire, The Legal Risks of Returning Results of Genomics Research, 
14 GENETICS MED. 473 (2012) (noting legal risks); R. C. Green et al., ACMG Recommendations 
for Reporting of Incidental Findings in Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing, 15 GENETICS 
MED. 565 (2013) (recommending that a set of identified mutations always be returned to 
patients); Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Models of Consent to Return of Incidental Findings in 
Genomic Research, 44 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 22 (2014) (noting different models of returning 
data and different possibilities for informed consent). 
 53. See Roger A. Ford & W. Nicholson Price II, Privacy and Accountability in Black-Box 
Medicine, 23 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2016) (describing the privacy concerns 
related to patient health information); Nicolas Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in the Age of 
Big Data, 81 UMKC L. REV. 385 (2012). 
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instance, problems with interoperability (and potentially with 
HIPAA) may be related to the otherwise-baffling persistence of faxed 
requests for information between different providers—faxes, after all, 
transmit data as simple images, a lowest-common-denominator 
format. Hand-answered, unvalidated, and difficult-to-audit fax 
requests suffer by comparison with high-security, auditable 
electronic data transfers, but remain the transfer mechanism of choice 
for some.54 
B. Secondary Risks 
The secondary risks from fragmented data come from efforts to 
use those data for future innovation.55 Such efforts include the FDA’s 
Sentinel initiative to monitor drug usage for safety risks,56 
observational studies to drive care (which can potentially be used to 
approve new drug indications under the 21st Century Cures Act57), 
machine-learning efforts to discover new biological relationships,58 
and implementations of a learning health care system generally.59 All 
of these secondary uses of health care data require that data be high 
quality and function much better without substantial gaps in data 
from different sources or time periods. Fragmentation and errors in 
health data hinder these efforts. If they don’t happen, that is one 
cost—the foregone benefit of innovation lost. But other risks 
materialize when innovation relies on incomplete or faulty data. To 
the extent that new care innovations are based on bad data, they may 
incorporate errors, biases, or other problems.60 A fundamental data 
mining principle is “garbage in, garbage out;” when health care 
fragmentation creates inaccuracies in data later used in innovation—
in addition to any inaccuracies that might have existed before—that 
innovation suffers, and so may future patients. 
 
 54. For instance, the University of Michigan Health System’s request for records from 
another doctor—which itself must be filled out by the patient for each other provider, since 
no centralized system exists—offers options only for mailing, phoning, or faxing to request 
records from another provider, and provides only contact information to receive 
information through those means of communication. See U. OF MICH. HOSPS. & HEALTH 
CTRS, REQUEST FOR OUTSIDE RECORDS – PATIENT INFORMATION FROM ANOTHER 
ORGANIZATION (2013), available at http://www.med.umich.edu/him/release-from-other-
organizations.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2DE-XUGB]. 
 55. See generally Eisenberg & Price, supra note 9 (describing potential innovation by 
health care payers using existing health data). 
 56. Susan Forrow et al., The Organizational Structure and Governing Principles of the Food 
and Drug Administration’s Mini-Sentinel Pilot Program, 21 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY &. DRUG 
SAFETY 12 (2012). 
 57. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3022 (requiring the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services to “[E]stablish a program to evaluate the potential use of real 
world evidence . . . to help support the approval of a new indication for a drug . . . .”). 
 58. See Price, supra note 20. 
 59. See, e.g., Harlan M. Krumholz, Big Data and New Knowledge in Medicine: The 
Thinking, Training, and Tools Needed for a Learning Health System, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1163 
(2014). 
 60. See, e.g., Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 7. 
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III. BENEFITS OF RESILIENT HEALTH DATA INFRASTRUCTURE 
The risks of fragmented and insecure health data may be at least 
partially addressed by considering the system in terms of 
infrastructure. The continued fragmentation of health data, where 
each health system actor is responsible for generating, collecting, and 
storing the data for its own interactions with patients, suggests that 
the system needs intervention to avoid ongoing risks. Given the 
potential benefits of integrated patient data, effort must be expended 
at a systemic level to create infrastructure for the sharing, integration, 
and storage of patient data. This effort need not take any one specific 
form, but the idea of health data infrastructure, and the risks of 
fragmented health data, suggest some features of the desired state. 
This Part briefly describes infrastructural resources, relying on a 
theoretical framework elaborated by Brett Frischmann.61 It then 
identifies how health data fit into an infrastructure model, both 
infrastructure for health data, and infrastructure of health data. 
Finally, it addresses the implications of an infrastructure model for 
policy interventions regarding health data. 
A. Infrastructural Resources 
Frischmann has described infrastructure resources as having 
three principal characteristics. First, an infrastructural resource “may 
be consumed nonrivalrously for some appreciable range of 
demand;”62 that is to say, consumption by one does not decrease the 
opportunity for consumption by another (within some range beyond 
which congestion may decrease the resource’s usability). This allows 
“widespread, shared access and productive use of the good,” and 
characterizes it as a pure or impure public good.63 Second, “[s]ocial 
demand for the resource is driven primarily by downstream 
productive activities that require the resource as an input.”64 Roads 
are not valuable principally because you can drive on them; roads are 
valuable because you can use them to get places and transport 
goods.65 Thus, infrastructure resources are most valuable as means 
for downstream uses rather than ends of themselves.66 Third, and 
finally, “[t]he resource may be used as an input into a wide range of 
goods and services, which may include private goods, public goods, 
and social goods.”67 It is not “optimized for a particular user or use;” 
instead, “[u]sers determine what to [do] with the capabilities that 
 
 61. FRISCHMANN, supra note 6. 
 62. Id. at 61. 
 63. Id. at 62. 
 64. Id. at 61. 
 65. Id. at 64. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 61. 
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infrastructure provide[s].”68 And because some of the outputs of 
infrastructure are public goods and social goods, industry is typically 
undersupplied by markets or, if privately supplied, is focused on an 
overly narrow set of uses.69 
B. Infrastructure For and Of Health Data 
So what is infrastructure for health data? I use this term to 
describe the set of resources that enable the collection, storage, 
transmission, and use of health data. And indeed the term “health 
data infrastructure” or “health information infrastructure” has 
typically meant just this. Over twenty years ago, Larry Gostin, in an 
article focused on health information privacy, defined “health 
information infrastructure” as “the basic, underlying framework of 
electronic information collection, storage, use, and transmission that 
supports all of the essential functions of the health care system.”70 
Health information infrastructure has been even more broadly 
defined by a leading national committee as “the values, practices, 
relationships, laws, standards, systems, applications, and 
technologies that support all facets of individual health, health care, 
and population health.”71 Thus, computer systems, data standards, 
and communication protocols are included within such very broad 
definitions of health infrastructure.72 What is not included, and is 
described below, are the data themselves. 
This concept of infrastructure for health data largely tracks 
Frischmann’s characterization. These resources are largely 
 
 68. Id. at 65. 
 69. Id. at 66. 
 70. Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451, 456 (1995) 
(citing COMM. ON REG’L HEALTH DATA NETWORKS, NAT’L ACAD. SCI., HEALTH DATA IN THE 
INFO. AGE: USE, DISCLOSURE, & PRIVACY (Molla S. Donaldson & Kathleen N. Lohr, eds. 
1994); WORK GROUP ON COMPUTERIZATION OF PATIENT RECORDS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., TOWARD A NAT’L HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE (1993); KAREN A. DUNCAN, 
HEALTH INFO. & HEALTH REFORM: UNDERSTANDING THE NEED FOR A NAT’L HEALTH INFO. 
SYSTEM (1994)). A decade earlier, a National Library of Medicine planning panel proposed 
the idea of U.S. health infrastructure based on “a national computer network for use by the 
entire biomedical community, both clinical and research professionals.” NAT’L LIBRARY OF 
MED. PLANNING PANEL NO. 4: LONG RANGE PLAN ON MED. INFORMATICS (1986) (quoted in 
Don E. Detmer, Building the National Health Information Infrastructure for Personal Health, 
Health Care Services, Public Health, and Research, 3 BMC MED. INFORMATICS & DECISION 
MAKING 3 (2003). See also JASON, A Robust Infrastructure Health Data Infrastructure, AGENCY 
FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY (Nov. 2013), https://www.healthit.gov/sites/ 
default/files/ptp13-700hhs_white.pdf [https://perma.cc/WP8C-MRT8] (noting the history of 
calls for health data infrastructure). 
 71. NAT’L COMM. ON VITAL & HEALTH STATS., INFO. FOR HEALTH: THE STRATEGY FOR 
BUILDING THE NAT’L HEALTH INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE 11 (2001); see also id. at 16 (elaborating 
on this definition and describing the goals of the National Health Information 
Infrastructure); see also JASON, supra note 70, at 1 (describing “a combination of electronic 
health records (EHRs) and improved exchange of health information” as “health data 
infrastructure”). 
 72. See also OECD, HEALTH INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 48, at 13 (not defining 
health data infrastructure but focusing on electronic health records and ways to link and 
connect them). 
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nonrivalrous—they can be used by many simultaneously without 
diminishing the benefits for others, and in fact increased use 
increases their value as networks and as standards to promote 
interoperability. In addition, their value lies not in their own use—
standards to encode health data or computer systems to store them 
are not valuable on their own, but because of the primary and 
secondary uses they enable for health data.73 And those uses are 
many, including “clinical and prevention services, quality assurance, 
financial reimbursement, monitoring of fraud and abuse, research, 
and public health services.”74 
As I have described above, however, we can also conceive of an 
infrastructure of health data—that is, the view that the data 
themselves are an infrastructural resource. But in fact, health data 
also fit the characteristics of an infrastructural resource as laid out by 
Frischmann.75 Health data are largely nonrivalrous, like other 
information goods—my use of a set of treatment outcomes to 
conduct innovative research does not interfere with your use of that 
same set of treatment outcomes to measure the quality and efficiency 
of the health care system.76 Health data are principally valuable for 
their downstream uses—it may be interesting to know one’s 
cholesterol levels, but those data are truly important for what users, 
whether patients, doctors, or researchers, can do with them.77 And 
finally, those downstream uses of health data are highly variable—
doctors can use health data to direct treatment for an individual 
patient, researchers can use health data to develop new drugs or 
treatments, and administrators can use health data to measure 
system quality and develop incentives to improve that quality, 
among many other possibilities.78 
 
 73. One could argue whether primary use of patient data by providers really qualifies 
as “downstream” use of the health infrastructure. If not, then this set of resources merely 
has a partially infrastructural quality, but the same arguments still apply, though possibly 
with lesser force. As noted above, these resources are generally described as infrastructural 
by scholars and policymakers. 
 74. Gostin, supra note 70, at 456. 
 75. For an application of Frischmann’s infrastructure model to big data more 
generally, see OECD, DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION: BIG DATA FOR GROWTH & WELL-BEING 
177–206 (2015) (hereinafter OECD, DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION). 
 76. See id. at 179–80 (describing big data as nonrivalrous). 
 77. See id. at 180–81 (describing big data as a capital good). As above, one could argue 
that health data uses at the point of care—that is, primary uses—are not, in fact, 
“downstream,” and that such value could be internalized at the point of care. Accepting 
this argument would mean that health data only have some infrastructural characteristics, 
instead of being fully infrastructural resources. The arguments about provision, 
governance, and the like described below still hold, though their magnitude may be 
decreased. Cf. id. at 63 (even though one can derive some consumption value from roads 
from driving for fun, they create most of their value through downstream uses and are thus 
infrastructural). 
 78. See id. at 181–83 (describing big data as a general-purpose input); Eisenberg & 
Price, supra note 9, at 14–23 (describing several of the uses to which health data can be put 
by one type of user, health insurers). 
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C. Implications of an Infrastructure Model 
What does an infrastructure model both for and of health data 
imply? I draw three primary implications from applying an 
infrastructure model: likely government involvement in provision, 
relatively open access, and a preference for centralization. 
1. Government Involvement 
Infrastructural resources are typically undersupplied by the 
private sector.79 Because they are inputs into a broad set of uses that 
include public and social goods, with typically substantial spillovers, 
it is difficult for private actors to capture the full value of investing in 
infrastructure.80 Accordingly, we expect private actors to invest at 
suboptimal levels in infrastructure spending, suggesting a need for 
some form of governmental investment or subsidy.81 The federal 
government is an obvious choice as the largest payer for health care 
and the entity with the possibility to break down state-by-state siloes 
of data, and indeed the federal government already operates 
substantial examples of health data infrastructure.82 With respect to 
infrastructure for health data, the federal government has long been 
involved in developing that infrastructure, including several 
substantial panels and reports.83 Most recently, the federal 
government committed billions of dollars in incentives in the 
HITECH Act for the adoption of electronic health records, and 
created corresponding penalties for failure to adopt them.84 
Nevertheless, the government has also taken a lighter touch in some 
areas of infrastructure for health data—it has forcefully stated the 
case for interoperability, but declined to mandate the standards that 
would make such interoperability more straightforward.85 As a 
result, electronic health record formats are still frequently 
 
 79. FRISCHMANN, supra note 6, at 14–15 (“society should expect underprovision of 
[infrastructure] goods.”). 
 80. Id. In addition, because demand-side users of infrastructure are often unable to 
capture the full value of public goods or social goods that they produce, demand for 
infrastructure resources, as indicated purely by competitive markets, may also decrease the 
supply of infrastructure resources. Id. at 72–78. 
 81. Id. at 14–15. 
 82. See Eisenberg & Price, supra note 9, at 40; FRISCHMANN, supra note 6, at 14 (noting 
government provision of goods as a classic solution to infrastructure problems, alongside 
government subsidies, community provision, and policies to allow private actors to charge 
supramarginal costs). The federal government is not the only choice; states have the 
primary role in regulating health, and might be another option. But state-by-state regimes 
risk replicating fragmentation on a state level, and ERISA limits state abilities to regulate 
the activities of some health actors such as many employer-funded health insurance plans. 
See Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016) (holding a Vermont law requiring 
insurers and providers to report claims data to a state-run database was preempted by 
ERISA). 
 83. For a few of the more high-profile reports, see supra notes 70–72. 
 84. See supra note 8. 
 85. See ONC, INTEROPERABILITY ROADMAP, supra note 44; ONC, 10-YEAR VISION, supra 
note 44. 
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incompatible, sometimes deliberately so, hampering the project of 
infrastructure for health data.86 
The federal government has also been involved in several 
initiatives aimed—explicitly or not—at developing an infrastructure 
of health data. These include the multi-site-but-connected Sentinel 
Project (wherein FDA collects safety information on drugs in use),87 
the Medicare and Medicaid systems, the Veterans Administration,88 
and—specifically focused on forward-looking health research—the 
Precision Medicine Initiative, aiming to collect comprehensive data 
on at least one million Americans.89 
An alternate model to direct federal investment could rely on 
public-private partnerships, joining a central government authority 
with nonprofit actors.90 There is no fundamental requirement that the 
infrastructure provider be governmental or nonprofit; a for-profit 
entity can provide public infrastructure given appropriate 
incentives.91 But relying on private actors, even with incentives, can 
reduce spillover benefits, as described in the next section. Overall, an 
infrastructure model for and of health data suggests at least some role 
for government involvement. 
2. Openness of Access 
A second implication of an infrastructure model is that the 
infrastructural resources might usefully be governed under a model 
that permits relatively open access to the resource. As Frischmann 
notes, infrastructure users frequently produce public goods and 
social goods (in this case including downstream technical innovation 
or information about system efficiency).92 Because they cannot 
capture the social value of these goods, they are less willing to pay 
for access to the infrastructural resource than is socially desirable.93 
This creates demand problems, so that using a competitive market to 
 
 86. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 87. See HEALTH AFFAIRS, Health Affairs Health Policy Brief, The FDA’s Sentinel  
Initiative (June 4, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicy 
brief_139.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9UM-M2GB]; Price, supra note 39, at 1441–42 (describing 
the Sentinel project’s data implications); Ryan Abbott, The Sentinel Initiative as Knowledge 
Commons, in GOVERNING MEDICAL COMMONS (Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison, & 
Katherine J. Strandburg, eds.) (forthcoming). 
 88. See Price, supra note 39, at 1440–41 (describing the Veterans Administration’s 
data). 
 89. Id. at 1442–43; Francis S. Collins & Harold Varmus, A New Initiative on Precision 
Medicine, 372 N. ENG. J. MED. 793 (2015). 
 90. See FRISCHMANN, supra note 6, at 14. 
 91. Examples include toll-road operators, power companies, and other public utilities. 
See id. Of course, these monopolies raise their own concerns about potential rent-seeking 
behavior. 
 92. Id. at 68–69. 
 93. Id. at 69. As Frischmann notes, although the classical approach to decreasing this 
public goods problem is to subsidize the production of that public good, subsidizing the 
production of the infrastructural input may also help. Id. at 71; see also supra Section III.C.1 
(describing such government subsidization of infrastructure). 
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regulate access to the infrastructural resource is likely to result in an 
access regime that is tighter than socially optimal.94 Frischmann 
suggests that a commons model, wherein access to the resource is 
available on nondiscriminatory terms to members of the relevant 
community—which may be the public at large—may be appropriate 
for many infrastructure resources.95 For publicly managed 
infrastructure, as I have suggested health data infrastructure is likely 
to be and likely should be, Frischmann argues that commons 
management is particularly appropriate because it creates a 
“spillover-rich environment” by: (1) allowing users to decide how to 
use the resource rather than picking beforehand which uses will be 
prioritized, and (2) sustaining the generic, rather than specialized, 
nature of the resource, which supports a broad range of potential 
uses.96 For health data infrastructure, these reasons suggest that 
making health data, and the infrastructural resources underlying 
those data, broadly available for a wide range of uses is likely to 
produce the greatest public benefit, whether to individual patient 
care, systemic evaluation, innovation to produce new medical 
products or new medical knowledge, or independent evaluations of 
those innovations.97 
To take a simplified example, imagine a health system 
implementing a database for secondary use. One version it could 
implement includes many health variables; another includes only 
variables relevant to detecting insurance fraud. Potential users 
include wealthy insurers and poor researchers. Insurers would likely 
pay the same for either database; if the health system gauged what 
system it should implement by market demand, and charged for 
access, it would likely go with the simpler database. But that 
database would be less socially valuable than a broader database that 
could enable research use—and other potential downstream uses. 
Keeping the resource generic, and keeping it broadly available, 
increases the possibilities for social benefit. But that raises the 
question of who will pay, which brings us back to the government 
subsidy point made above. 
Broad access to infrastructure for health data seems to raise 
relatively few red flags, but broad access to infrastructure of health 
data—that is, to the data themselves—raises the possibility of 
substantial privacy concerns. As Roger Ford and I have previously 
noted, the large amounts of health data useful for developing 
 
 94. FRISCHMANN, supra note 6, at 71. 
 95. Id. at 92–93. Frischmann notes that whether any particular infrastructure resource 
should be managed as commons “remains[s an] incredibly difficult question[] that must be 
answered contextually.” Id. at 93. 
 96. Id. at 94. 
 97. See, e.g., Price, supra note 39 (describing the possibility of using big health data to 
develop sophisticated algorithms for use in health care); Ford & Price, supra note 53 
(describing the possibility of independent evaluation of such algorithms). 
2017] RISK AND RESILIENCE 83 
machine-learning-based algorithms in health care include sensitive 
data for about which many worry.98 Addressing these concerns—or 
at least considering them carefully and weighing their magnitude—is 
an important aspect of health data infrastructure.99 At the very least, 
addressing privacy concerns may increase the likelihood of voluntary 
patient buy-in to the idea of broadly sharing health data.100 
3. Centralization 
Finally, an infrastructure model raises the issue of centralization, 
especially for an infrastructure of health data. At one end of the 
spectrum, it could exist as a fully centralized health database, where 
each patient has a single integrated patient record to which different 
care providers or other entities add data. Alternately, health data 
could reside in decentralized repositories, much like the current 
system, but with increased connectivity between the repositories and 
more rigorous standards that let data be meaningfully transferred 
between and collated across repositories.101 This model is closest to 
the current system—but that closeness demonstrates potential 
problems, since even with federal initiatives to drive interoperability, 
fragmentation persists.102 At the other end of the spectrum, a fully 
decentralized system might have individual patients maintain their 
own data, such as on a personal medical card that includes the entire 
patient record.103 Such a system would similarly rely on meaningful 
standards to ensure transportability and access of patient data by 
different actors in the health care system. 
Any of these systems might potentially work as infrastructure 
for health data, to help enable care. However, a centralized system 
likely carries a substantial benefit when considering health data as 
infrastructure for later health innovation.104 Decentralized data are 
 
 98. Ford & Price, supra note 53; but see Carl F. Schneider, A Comment on Privacy and 
Accountability in Black-Box Medicine, MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) 
(arguing these privacy concerns may be overblown). 
 99. See Gostin, supra note 70, at 485–89 (noting the need to consider health information 
privacy within the context of infrastructure for health data); JASON, supra note 70, at 31–34 
(focusing on privacy in infrastructure for health data). 
 100. See JASON, supra note 70, at 31 (discussing the need for patient trust). Of course, 
some patients see little need for health data privacy, and willingly share their information 
publicly. See, e.g., THE PERSONAL GENOME PROJECT, http://personalgenomes.org 
[https://perma.cc/MZ9W-SJY5] (last visited June 10, 2017) (creating a database for 
individuals to publicly share their genomic and health data). 
 101. See, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note 8, at 148–49 (describing federated databases and 
their privacy benefits). The Sentinel system follows this model. Id. 
 102. See supra Section I.B. 
 103. See, e.g., Michael Chen & Adrian Gropper, Patient-Centered EHR Features and Demo, 
(Oct. 15, 2016), http://www.hieofone.org [https://perma.cc/PV2Y-9X8W] (describing and 
demoing the concept for an entirely patient-focused individual health record); Gostin, supra 
note 70, at 461–63 (describing, in 1995, the potential storage of health data on electronic 
health record cards). 
 104. I am certainly not the first to argue for a centralized health data system. See, e.g., 
Gostin, supra note 70, at 463–70 (discussing several limited health databases, federal and 
otherwise, and discussing the possibility of a national data collection initiative). The claim 
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fragmented along different dimensions—not necessarily among 
different providers and actors in the health system, but between 
different patients. However, many benefits of health data rely on 
aggregating data from many patients, including precision medicine, 
quality metrics, and efficiency measures. The risks for health 
innovation described above include the problems of biases from 
incomplete data and the risk of innovation being absent altogether. 
Centralized health data ameliorate these risks by creating 
comprehensive datasets for future analysis. 
Centralization standing alone also raises concerns about limited 
competition (if there is only one resource, there is no competition by 
definition) and about limited access (if actors are shut out of the 
single resource, where else can they turn?). These concerns are 
lessened by the considerations suggested before of government 
involvement and commons management. If a centralized health 
database is government run or subsidized, competition is of limited 
use—and, as noted, competition is often insufficient to adequately 
drive the creation of infrastructural resources.105 Similarly, effective 
commons management largely forecloses the problem of limited 
access—again, reflecting the reality that market-driven demand for 
infrastructural resources is often insufficient to reflect the social 
benefits that come from their broad use.106 
Centralization has complex effects on potential privacy risks. On 
the one hand, centralization creates a broader picture of an 
individual’s health—indeed, that’s the point—but that makes it easier 
to derive more information about an already-identified individual, 
and also potentially makes it easier to identify a de-identified 
individual from a larger collection of data.107 A centralized system is 
also a more attractive target for attacks and hacking attempts. On the 
other hand, centralization, or just a coherent infrastructure, allows 
some privacy-enhancing technologies to be deployed, such as one-
way hashing.108 From a security standpoint, a centralized resource is 
a more attractive target, but can also be the subject of substantially 
 
of benefits from a federal system is ultimately an empirical claim, and would need to be 
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more security given the possible concentration of resources at a single 
location. Overall, the case for centralization is not ironclad, but the 
increased benefits make it strongly worth considering. 
CONCLUSION 
The health system relies on data, but collects and maintains 
those data in a haphazard, fragmented, and insecure way that creates 
real risks for patients and for the system as a whole. Given market 
incentives driving competition among different data systems and 
health actors, health data seem likely to remain fragmented without 
broader systemic action. Conceiving of infrastructure both for and of 
health data suggests that standardized, centralized collection and 
maintenance of health data, subsidized and managed as a commons, 
may create substantial goods at both the individual and systemic 
level. If we are to realize the goal of data-informed patient care and 
data-driven development of future medical technology, an 
infrastructure both for and of health data provides a step in the right 
direction. 
 
  
